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Apple launched his new iPad in the US on April 3, 2010. The pictures are well known:
Large queues in a lot of cities all over the US. The iPad was then consecutively launched in
diﬀerent countries.1 One may argue from diﬀerent perspectives why this ordering of countries
was chosen by Apple. But two things are striking: (i) It did not sell to all countries at the
same time, and (ii) the countries that were served are very similar concerning their level of
development and size. These export strategies are quite common. Many empirical studies,
e.g., Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2004), show that most exporting ﬁrms sell to only one
foreign market and that the frequency of ﬁrms’ selling to multiple markets declines with
the number of destinations. More recent evidence by Lawless (2009) using ﬁrm-level export
destination data of Irish ﬁrms and Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011) of French ﬁrms show
that ﬁrms do not enter markets according to a common hierarchy. Arkolakis (2010) and
Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011) explain this pattern by assuming not only market but
also ﬁrm-speciﬁc heterogeneity in entry costs and market size. However, these approaches
are not able to explain why the export strategy of one and the same ﬁrm varies widely across
countries with similar characteristics.2 We show that no additional heterogeneity is necessary
to explain why the same ﬁrm behaves diﬀerently in similar export markets and why similar
ﬁrms with similar products serve diﬀerent export markets.
We propose an answer based on capacity constraining labor market frictions. We merge
a generalized version of the on-the-job search model by Burdett and Mortensen (1998) with
the new trade, monopolistic competition model with heterogenous ﬁrms by Melitz (2003) and
show how convex vacancy creation costs lead to capacity constraints. As a result exporting
ﬁrms do not grow in order to fully serve foreign demand. Given entry costs to each export
market, they rather react by selling only to a few markets at a higher price. Thus, even if
only symmetric countries trade, exporting ﬁrms sell – depending on their productivity – to
only part of the countries. More productive ﬁrms export to more countries. This export
1On May 28, 2010 in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, Switzerland and the UK. On
July 23, 2010 in Austria, Belgium, Hong Kong, Ireland, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand and
Singapore. On September 17, 2010 in China. Source: http://www.apple.com/pr/products/ipad/ipad.html.
2Or in the words of Eaton, Kortum, Kramarz (2011): “In particular, it leaves the vastly diﬀerent perfor-
mance of the same ﬁrm in diﬀerent markets as a residual. Our analysis points to the need for further research
into accounting for this variation.”
1reaction also implies a diﬀerent price structure. In contrast to Melitz (2003) more productive
exporting ﬁrms might charge higher prices in the domestic (and the export) market than less
productive non-exporting ﬁrms.
This predicted trade and price patterns can be caused by any type of capacity constraints
resulting from labor market frictions, credit constraints or any other friction that induces
increasing marginal costs of production. While many empirical studies have emphasized the
importance of capacity constraints in determining the export behavior of ﬁrms, almost no
study has convincingly identiﬁed a speciﬁc channel.3 The only exception know to us is Manova
(2008), who nicely isolates the eﬀect of equity market liberalization on export behavior using
panel data for 91 countries.4 Still, Manova’s (2008) analysis does not rule out that labor
market frictions might also be an important contributing factor. Labor market frictions,
more speciﬁcally high costs of hiring qualiﬁed workers – a phenomena, which is often referred
to as ”labor shortage” in the popular press – are often blamed for reducing ﬁrms’ ability to
meet their demand. The ManpowerGroup provides extensive evidence of ”labor shortage”,
speciﬁcally of highly qualiﬁed workers in the “2011 Talent Shortage Survey” based on nearly
40,000 surveys of employers in 39 countries. There is also a heavy debate about the eﬀects
of ”labor shortage” on the global competitiveness of China. The New-York-Times wrote on
April 3, 2006 that “data from oﬃcials suggest that major export industries are looking for at
least one million additional workers, and the real number could be much higher”. A Chinese
supplier survey by Global Sources (2011) reports that “the persistent labor shortage has
nearly driven growth in China’s export industries to a halt”. Evidence is also provided from
the IT branch, where Apple belongs to.5 Lately The National Business Review wrote about
the IT professional shortage in New Zealand6 and Webmaster Europe, the International-
3Magnier and Toujas-Bernate (1994) and Madden, Savage, and Thong (1994) argue that exporting ﬁrms
may not always be able to meet the demands for its goods due to a capacity constraints. Ruhl and Willis
(2008), Eaton, Eslava, Krizan, Kugler and Tybout (2009), and Fajgelbaum (2011) point out that ﬁrms need
time to grow in order to be large enough to export. Redding and Venables (2004) and Fugazza (2004) ﬁnd
that country speciﬁc supply-side conditions can explain part of the diﬀerences in export performance.
4Blum, Claro, and Horstmann (2010) assume that capital capacity constraints are responsible for ﬂuctua-
tions in export behavior of Chilean ﬁrms. Their structural estimation is not able to identfy a certain channel
since their theory does not allow for diﬀerent channels.
5In an interview on June 1, 2010 Apple Inc. CEO Steve Jobs said that the idea for the iPad came before
the iPhone. However, “...I put the tablet project on a shelf, because the phone was more important.”
6See http://www.nbr.co.nz/article/it-professional-shortage-continues-survey-118981.
2European labor union for Internet professionals, stated that the IT professional shortage will
continue in 2010 in Germany.7
In this paper we also show that trade liberalization increases ﬁrms’ expected proﬁts and
triggers not only ﬁrm growth, but in contrast to Melitz (2003) also ﬁrm entry. This is well
in line with recent empirical ﬁndings by Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2004, 2011) that
suggests that a large fraction of the adjustment in market shares comes from changes in the
number of ﬁrms and not from the adjustments of the amount sold by existing ﬁrms. At the
same time, opening up to trade still forces less productive ﬁrms to leave the market like in
Melitz (2003).
By allowing ﬁrms with diﬀerent productivities to pay diﬀerent wages the on-the-job search
model by Burdett and Mortensen (1998) oﬀers a natural environment to study the eﬀects of
trade liberalization on wage dispersion and unemployment.8 Trade liberalization increases
wage dispersion since search frictions pin down the lowest wage at the level of unemployment
beneﬁts, while increased proﬁts of exporting ﬁrms increase wages at the top of the distribu-
tion. Higher proﬁts of exporting ﬁrms also increase job creation (both at the extensive and
the intensive margin), which implies a lower unemployment rate. The eﬀects of trade liberal-
ization on unemployment and wage inequality have already been analyzed using the Krugman
(1979, 1980) and Melitz (2003) framework. Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2009, 2010)
allow ﬁrms to screen workers of diﬀerent abilities. They ﬁnd that lower variable trade costs
shift the industry composition from low- to high-productivity ﬁrms, increase wage inequality
and can increase or decrease unemployment. The wage dispersion in their framework arises
from the assumed heterogeneity of workers. However, empirical results show that even very
similar workers are paid diﬀerent wages (Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis, 1999; Abowd and
Kramarz, 1999). Egger and Kreickemeier (2008) explain intra-group wage inequality among
ex ante identical workers due to a fair wage-eﬀort mechanism and suggest that trade liber-
alization increases wage dispersion and can increase unemployment if wage demands exceed
increases in proﬁts. Similarly, Amiti and Davis (2011) assume a fair wage constraint and
show that a fall in output tariﬀs lowers wages at import-competing ﬁrms, but boost wages
at exporting ﬁrms. Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011) show that unemployment falls if
7http://www.webmasters-europe.org/modules/news/article.php?storyid=95.
8Fajgelbaum (2011) uses an on-the-job search equilibrium model based on Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002)
to investigate how labor market frictions inﬂuence the growth path and export decision of ﬁrms.
3trade is liberalized.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we present the general framework
that links the new trade model by Melitz (2003) with the on-the-job search model by Burdett
and Mortensen (1998). In section 3 we analyze the equilibrium in a closed economy. In section
4 we investigate the eﬀects of trade liberalization and compare the results with the literature
focussing particularly on the comparison with Melitz (2003). Section 5 introduces vacancy
creation with convex vacancy creation costs. We then simulate the model with convex vacancy
creation costs and show that our main eﬀects prevail. Section 6 concludes and sets out future
research objectives.
2 Framework
The model merges the new trade model of Melitz (2003), where ﬁrms face monopolistic
competition with perfect labor markets, with the on-the-job search model by Burdett and
Mortensen (1998), where ﬁrms have local monopsony power to set wages. This setup naturally
incorporates wage dispersion into the trade model of Melitz (2003) and allows us to study the
eﬀects of trade liberalization on the wage distribution. Labor market frictions also change
the pattern of trade since they impose a capacity constraint on ﬁrms.
2.1 Labor market and workers’ search strategy
The model has an inﬁnite horizon, is set in continuous time and concentrates on steady states.
The measure of ﬁrms M in the economy will be endogenously determined in the product
market. In the basic framework, we assume that all ﬁrms face the same ﬁxed contact rate
ηv. This is identical to assuming that all ﬁrms open the same number of vacancies v due to
zero vacancy creation cost for v ≤ v and inﬁnitely high vacancy creation costs for v > v. In
section 5 we allow ﬁrms with diﬀerent productivities to decide on the number of vacancies.
In the basic model the total number of contacts made by active ﬁrms is given by ηMv.
Workers are risk neutral and inﬁnitely lived. The measure of workers is normalized to
one. Workers can either be unemployed receiving unemployment beneﬁts z or employed at a
wage w that might diﬀer across ﬁrms. Both unemployed and employed workers are searching
for a job with the same intensity. Following Burdett and Mortensen (1998) the probability
of a worker to meet a ﬁrm follows a Poisson process with the rate λ(M). The contact rate of
4a worker depends on the number of ﬁrms M in the market. Since aggregation requires that
the total number of ﬁrm contacts equals the total number of worker contacts, we get
λ(M) = ηMv. (1)
The contact rate of a worker is therefore increasing in the number of active ﬁrms in the
economy.
Production starts if a worker accepts the wage oﬀer made by a ﬁrm. F (w) denotes the
wage oﬀer distribution of employers. The employment relationship ends if either the worker
quits to work for a better paying job, which happens at rate λ(M)[1 − F (w)], or the worker
quits for an exogenous reason, which happens at rate κ, or the entire ﬁrm has to close for an
exogenous reason, which happens at rate δ. If the worker quits for an exogenous reason or if
the ﬁrm closes, workers become unemployed.
Given the wage oﬀer distribution F (w), a worker’s (ﬂow) value rU of being unemployed
consists of unemployment beneﬁts z, plus the expected gain from searching. The latter
depends on the contact rate λ(M) and the surplus of being employed rather than unemployed.
The (ﬂow) value of being employed rV (w) is given by the current wage plus the expected
surplus from ﬁnding a better paid job and the expected loss from becoming unemployed, i.e.,
rU = z + λ(M)
Z w
w
max[V (e w) − U,0]dF (e w), (2a)
rV (w) = w + λ(M)
Z w
w
max[V (e w) − V (w),0]dF (e w)
+(κ + δ)[U − V (w)], (2b)
where r is the interest rate with which workers discount future payments. The lowest and
the highest wage paid in the economy are denoted by w and w, respectively.
As shown by Mortensen and Neumann (1988) the optimal search strategy for a worker is
characterized by a reservation wage wr, where an unemployed worker is indiﬀerent between
accepting or rejecting a wage oﬀer, i.e., U = V (wr). Using the above value functions it is
straight forward to show that wr is independent of F (w) and given by wr = z. Thus, only
wages that are at least as high as unemployment beneﬁts z are acceptable for unemployed
workers. Equivalently, employed workers will only change employers if the wage e w oﬀered by
the outside ﬁrm exceeds the current wage w.
52.2 Product market and ﬁrms’ decisions
Firms are risk neutral and the life of a ﬁrm is exponentially distributed with parameter δ.
Following Ethier (1982), Ludema (2002), Melitz (2003) and Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) the
ﬁnal output is a CES-aggregate9, i.e.,








, where 0 < ρ < 1. (3)
The measure of the set Ω equals the mass of available intermediate goods, and q0 is an
outside good serving as num´ eraire. Each intermediate good ω is produced by a single ﬁrm in
a monopolistic competitive market. Thus, the mass of intermediate goods producers is equal
to the number of active ﬁrms M in the market.
We assume perfect competition in the ﬁnal goods market. Proﬁt maximization of com-
petitive ﬁnal goods producers leads to the following demand for intermediate good ω,
q (ω) = p(ω)
− 1
1−ρ . (4)
Labor l(ω) is the unique factor of production. Firms diﬀer in labor productivity such that
the output of a ﬁrm that produces intermediate good ω is given by q (ω) = ϕ(ω)l(ω), where
ϕ(ω) denotes the labor productivity of intermediate input producer ω. As it is standard in
the literature we use ϕ to index intermediate input producers. The productivity ϕ is drawn





The size l(w(ϕ)) of the labor force employed by a ﬁrm with productivity ϕ depends on
its wage w(ϕ). Unlike in the competitive labor market assumed in Melitz (2003) ﬁrms are
not able to adjust their labor input freely to produce the output they want. The size of a
ﬁrm’s labor force l(w(ϕ)) and consequently the output a ﬁrm produces is determined by the
ﬁrm’s position in the wage oﬀer distribution F (w(ϕ)), which detemines the hiring rate and
the rate at which workers quit to better paying ﬁrms.
Following Burdett and Mortensen (1998) we assume for simplicity that the discount rate
is set to zero. Thus, the ﬁrm closure rate δ acts as discount rate. The ﬁrms’ optimization
problem is equivalent to maximizing steady state proﬁt ﬂows10, i.e.,
δΠ(ϕ) = max
w [p(ϕ)q (ϕ) − w(ϕ)l(w(ϕ)) − f], (5)
9The num´ eraire good q0 in the production technology in (3) absorbs all changes in aggregate demand.
10Coles (2001) and Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2010) analyze the out of steady state dynamics of the
Burdett-Mortensen model and show that the position of a ﬁrm within the wage distribution equals the position
in the productivity distribution even if ﬁrm size is out of steady state.
6where p(ϕ) denotes the price that the ﬁrm will charge in the monopolistic competitive market
and the ﬁxed costs f reﬂects a per period cost component that is required to serve consumers.
It is assumed to be identical for all ﬁrms.
Given its expected proﬁt a ﬁrm decides whether it will enter the market depending on
its productivity ϕ. A ﬁrm will start to produce if proﬁts are positive, i.e., δΠ(ϕ) ≥ 0. The
cutoﬀ productivity ϕ∗ is therefore deﬁned by
δΠ(ϕ∗) = 0. (6)
Thus, only ﬁrms with productivity ϕ ∈ [ϕ∗,ϕ] will be active in the market, assuming that
ϕ∗ ≥ ϕ.
Since all active ﬁrms – except the cutoﬀ ﬁrm – make positive proﬁts, the expected dis-
counted proﬁt of a ﬁrm before knowing its productivity type ϕ is also positive, i.e.,







where 1 − Γ(ϕ∗) equals the probability that a ﬁrm will draw a productivity level ϕ high
enough to ensure that production is proﬁtable. Π equals the average discounted proﬁt of all
active ﬁrms.
Before a ﬁrm gets to know its productivity, it has to pay the ﬁxed investment cost fe.
Free entry of ﬁrms ensures that ﬁrms enter the market until the expected discounted proﬁt
before entering the market equals the ﬁxed investment cost fe, i.e.,
[1 − Γ(ϕ∗)]Π =
Z ϕ
ϕ∗
Π(ϕ)γ (ϕ)dϕ = fe. (7)
The zero-cutoﬀ condition (6) and the free entry condition (7) determine the number of active
ﬁrms M and the labor productivity ϕ∗ of the active ﬁrm with the lowest productivity in an
economy.
2.3 Aggregation and steady state conditions
Aggregation requires that total output produced per period equals the payments made by
ﬁrms, i.e.,
Y = q0 + (1 − u)
Z ϕ
ϕ∗
w(ϕ)dG(w(ϕ)) + fM + MδΠ. (8)
Thus, wage payments plus aggregate proﬁt per period have to equal total value of output
produced each period. Aggregate proﬁts are used to ﬁnance the ﬁxed investment cost of new
7incumbent ﬁrms that attempt entry, i.e.,
MδΠ = feMe, (9)
where Me is the total mass of ﬁrms that attempt entry and pay the ﬁxed investment costs
fe each period. A large unbounded set of potential new ﬁrms ensures an unlimited supply of
potential entrants that is able to replace ﬁrms that go out of business. Steady state requires
that the ﬂow into the pool of active ﬁrms is equal to the ﬂow out of this pool, i.e.,
[1 − Γ(ϕ∗)]Me = δM. (10)
It is straight forward to show that the free entry condition (7) guarantees that steady state
conditions (9) and (10) hold.
In steady state in- and outﬂows into and out of employment oﬀset each other such that the
unemployment rate and the distribution of employment over ﬁrms are stationary. Equating
the ﬂows in and out of unemployment gives the steady state measure of unemployed, i.e.,
u =
κ + δ
κ + δ + λ(M)
. (11)
Noting that the aggregate number of matches in the economy depends on the number of
active ﬁrms M in the economy (as stated in equation (1)), the unemployment rate decreases
if the number of active ﬁrms in the economy increases.
Equating the inﬂow and outﬂow into the group of workers employed at a wage w(ϕ) or
less gives the steady-state measure of employed workers earning a wage less than w(ϕ), i.e.,
λ(M)F (w(ϕ))u = G(w(ϕ))(1 − u)[κ + δ + λ(M)[1 − F (w(ϕ))]] (12)
=⇒ G(w(ϕ)) =
(κ + δ)F (w(ϕ))
κ + δ + λ(M)[1 − F (w(ϕ))]
. (13)
Labor market frictions constrain the number of workers a ﬁrm can recruit. This is the
reason why we call these labor market frictions capacity constraining. Like in Burdett and
Mortensen (1998) the average number of workers employed by a ﬁrm equals the number of
workers employed at a certain wage, i.e., g (w(ϕ))(1 − u), divided by the number of ﬁrms
paying a certain wage, i.e., f (w(ϕ))M. Diﬀerentiating equation (12) with respect to the
w(ϕ) and substituting the aggregate matching condition (1), the steady state measure of
unemployment (11) and employment (13) allows us to write the steady state labor force of a
8ﬁrm paying the wage w(ϕ) as
l(w(ϕ)) =
ηv (κ + δ)
[κ + δ + ηMv [1 − F (w(ϕ))]]
2. (14)
Like in Burdett and Mortensen (1998) equation (14) implies that the size of a ﬁrm’s labor
force l(w(ϕ)) is increasing in the wage w(ϕ) since on-the-job search implies that a high wage
ﬁrm attracts more employed workers from ﬁrms paying lower wages and loses less workers
to employers paying higher wages. Equation (14) also shows that a higher number of active
ﬁrms M results in additional competition between ﬁrms and decreases the size of each ﬁrm’s
labor force. As shown in section 5, this eﬀect is still present but does not necessarily dominate
if we endogenize the recruiting rate ηv, i.e., if we allow ﬁrms to grow by posting vacancies.
3 Equilibrium in a closed economy
3.1 Equilibrium deﬁnition
We start by deﬁning the product and labor market equilibrium in a closed economy. A labor
market equilibrium is characterized by the contact rate of unemployed workers, the unemploy-
ment rate, the wage oﬀer and wage earnings distribution, i.e., the set {λ(M),u,F (w(ϕ)),G(w(ϕ))}.
Firms oﬀer wages w(ϕ) that maximize proﬁts given their productivity ϕ, the demand func-
tion they face in the monopolistic competitive market q (ϕ) = p(ϕ)
− 1
1−ρ, the wage oﬀer
distribution F (w(ϕ)) posted by other ﬁrms and the optimal search strategy of workers, i.e.,
wr = z. The contact rate of unemployed workers λ(M), the unemployment rate u and the
wage earnings distribution G(w(ϕ)) in equations (1), (11) and (13) have to be consistent
with steady state turnover given the productivity distribution Γ(ϕ), the cutoﬀ productivity
ϕ∗ and the wage oﬀer distribution F(w(ϕ)) posted by ﬁrms.
A product market equilibrium is a set {ϕ∗,M} such that intermediate good producers
enter the product market if their productivity ensures a positive proﬁt, i.e., ϕ ≥ ϕ∗, where
the zero-cutoﬀ productivity has to satisfy equation (6). The number of active ﬁrms M in
the product market has to be consistent with proﬁts of active ﬁrms being used to ﬁnance
the ﬁxed investment cost fe of potential new market entrants necessary to replace the ﬁrms
exiting the product market. Thus, the number of active ﬁrms M has to satisfy the free entry
condition (7).
93.2 Firms’ wage oﬀers
Since each ﬁrm has some monopoly power in the product market and some monopsony
power in the labor market, a ﬁrm will chose its wage oﬀer such that the marginal revenue of
increasing labor input with a higher wage is oﬀset by the additional wage cost. The optimality
condition for a ﬁrm with productivity ϕ, given the distribution of wages oﬀered by all other










! = 0. (15)
As in Mortensen (1990) more productive ﬁrms will pay higher wages if the marginal revenue
is higher than the wage, i.e., ϕρρl(w(ϕ))
(ρ−1) − w(ϕ) > 0 (see Appendix A).
If the marginal product is lower than the wage, ﬁrms will reduce their wage in order to
reduce their labor force l(w(ϕ)) and to increase their marginal revenue. Thus, the optimality
condition (15) is only satisﬁed for all active ﬁrms with productivity ϕ ≥ ϕ∗ if the marginal
revenue of the least productive ﬁrm ϕ∗ is higher than the level of unemployment beneﬁts z.
We therefore assume:
Assumption 1: The marginal revenue of the least productive ﬁrm ϕ∗ is higher than the




ηv (κ + δ)




If Assumption 1 is violated, the wage distribution will be characterized by a mass point at
the level of unemployment beneﬁts since ﬁrms with a marginal revenue below z will not ﬁnd
it optimal to increase their labor input by increasing wages (see Appendix A).
Given Assumption 1 wages w(ϕ) increase with productivity ϕ like in Mortensen (1990).




for all ϕ ∈ [ϕ∗,ϕ]. (17)
The position of a ﬁrm in the wage oﬀer distribution F (w(ϕ)) is equivalent to its position in
the productivity distribution of active ﬁrms. Thus, the position of a ﬁrm in the productivity
distribution of active ﬁrms determines a ﬁrm’s labor input. The fact that a ﬁrm cannot adjust
the size of its labor force freely to changes in output demand leads to a capacity constraint
that implies that a ﬁrm will adjust its output price to reﬂect changes in demand.
10Since a ﬁrm can only recruit workers if it pays at least a wage that equals the level of
unemployment beneﬁts z, the least productive ﬁrm that is active in the market will oﬀer
a wage equal to unemployment beneﬁts z. The optimal wage w(ϕ) posted by a ﬁrm with












ρ de ϕ − f
￿
. (18)
The derivation can be found in Appendix B. Multiplying equation (18) by l(w(ϕ)) reveals
that total wage payments are given by revenues (the ﬁrst term on the rhs in brackets) minus
total proﬁts of a ﬁrm with productivity ϕ (the second term on the rhs in brackets), minus
ﬁxed costs. Note that in contrast to Melitz (2003), total proﬁts are a function of wages,
which reﬂects the fact that ﬁrms have not only monopoly power on the product market but
also monopsony power on the labor market.
3.3 Firm entry decision
Free entry of potential ﬁrms ensures that the expected discounted proﬁt from entering the
product market [1 − Γ(ϕ∗)]Π equals the ﬁxed investment cost fe as stated in equation (7).















The expected discounted proﬁt decreases with the number of active ﬁrms because the size of
a ﬁrm’s labor force l(w(ϕ)) is a decreasing function of the number of active ﬁrms M. At the
same time the expected discounted proﬁt increases if the cutoﬀ productivity decreases because
the likelihood of having a productivity draw that is suﬃciently high to make proﬁts increases.
Using the implicit function theorem, we show in Appendix C that the free entry condition
deﬁnes a decreasing relation between the zero-cutoﬀ productivity ϕ∗ and the number of active
ﬁrms M in the market.
A ﬁrm has to oﬀer at least the level of unemployment beneﬁt z in order to attract any
worker. Given this lower bound of the support of the wage oﬀer distribution F (w(ϕ)), the
zero-cutoﬀ productivity ﬁrm ϕ∗ employs l(z) = l(w(ϕ∗)) workers. Utilizing the per period
proﬁt deﬁnition (5) implies that the zero-cutoﬀ productivity level ϕ∗ is deﬁned by δΠ(ϕ∗) = 0.
11Figure 1: Number of ﬁrms and cutoﬀ productivity
Substituting l(w(ϕ∗)) gives
￿
ϕ∗ ηv (κ + δ)




ηv (κ + δ)
[κ + δ + ηMv]
2 + f. (20)
Since the zero-cutoﬀ productivity ﬁrm pays the wage z, it will only attract unemployed
workers and lose its workers to all other ﬁrms that pay higher wages. Consequently, a higher
number of active ﬁrms M increases the number of quits at the zero-cutoﬀ productivity ﬁrm
and, therefore, reduces its steady state labor input. This decreases the ﬁrm’s net revenue.
The ﬁrm will subsequently no longer be able to cover the wage payments and the ﬁxed costs
f. Thus, only more proﬁtable ﬁrms will be able to survive in the market, which increases the
zero-cutoﬀ productivity. Using the implicit function theorem and Assumption 1 we show in
Appendix C that the zero proﬁt condition deﬁnes an increasing relation between the zero-
cutoﬀ productivity ϕ∗ and the number of active ﬁrms M in the market. Thus, the free entry
condition and the zero-cutoﬀ condition determine a unique equilibrium as shown in Figure
1, as long as unemployment beneﬁts z and ﬁxed costs f are low enough to ensure that an
equilibrium exists.
124 Open economy
Assume that there are n+1 identical countries that diﬀer only in the variety Ω of goods that
they produce. Given that ﬁnal output producers love variety, they are interested in trading
with other countries. Due to the symmetry of countries, intermediate goods producers face
the same demand curve in the export market as they face in the domestic market, i.e.,
q (ϕ) = p(ϕ)
1/(ρ−1). Serving an export market involves some ﬁxed costs fx ≥ f per period
and some proportional shipping costs per good shipped to the export market. Thus, the price
of an export good at the factory gate is given by px (ϕ)/τ = pd (ϕ), where pd (ϕ) denotes the
price in the domestic market.
Given that an exporting ﬁrm with productivity ϕ can only produce the ﬁxed output
ϕl(w(ϕ)), it will chose the number of export markets j such that the output sold in j export
markets and the domestic market maximizes proﬁts. Splitting the output for all export
markets is not proﬁt-maximizing given the capacity constraints and exporting ﬁxed costs.




1 + jτρ/(ρ−1)q (ϕ), and (21)
qx (ϕ) =
τρ/(ρ−1)
1 + jτρ/(ρ−1)q (ϕ), (22)
at the domestic and at each export market, respectively (see derivation in Appendix D). The
proﬁt of a ﬁrm serving j export markets is therefore given by








ρ − w(ϕ)l(w(ϕ)) − f − jfx
￿
. (23)
In addition to the closed economy a ﬁrm with productivity ϕ decides not only on the wage
w(ϕ) but also on the number j of countries it wants to export to. Hence, it will choose the




x the export cutoﬀ productivity for a ﬁrm that decides to export to j ≤ n
countries. Firms with ϕ ≥ ϕ
j
x ﬁnd it optimal to export to j or more countries while ﬁrms
with ϕ < ϕ
j
x will only serve less than j foreign markets and the domestic market (or only
the domestic market). Wages chosen by ﬁrms have to satisfy the ﬁrst order condition like in
13a closed economy. The non-exporting ﬁrm with the lowest productivity level ϕ∗ will pay the
reservation wage z such that unemployed workers are willing to start working. As shown in
































x = ϕ and ϕ0
x = ϕ∗.
Note that proﬁt maximization ensures that the wage function does not jump upward at
ϕ
j
x, i.e., that the support of the wage distribution is connected. To see this suppose the
opposite, i.e., that the exporting ﬁrm with the lowest productivity ϕ
j







= w(ϕ) + ∆, where ∆ > 0 denotes the jump at w(ϕ) where productivity is given
by ϕ = ϕ
j
x − ε for any small ε > 0. The wage jump does not increase the number of workers
of ﬁrm ϕ
j
x since it has the same position in the wage distribution as before. It is, therefore,
optimal for the ﬁrm to pay a wage that is only slightly above w(ϕ) and save the wage costs
∆ per worker. Thus, the wage function is continuous on [ϕ∗,ϕ].
For low productive ﬁrms it is optimal to serve only the domestic market, while more
productive ﬁrms will export. At the export-cutoﬀ productivity ϕ
j
x the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent
between serving j export markets and the domestic market or serving j − 1 export markets












. As proven in Appendix D more













1 + jτρ/(ρ−1)￿(1−ρ) −
￿
1 + (j − 1)τρ/(ρ−1)￿(1−ρ)i. (25)
Proposition 1 The number of export markets j ≤ n served by a ﬁrm is increasing in its
productivity, i.e., the export cutoﬀ productivity ϕ
j
x is increasing in j.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Proposition 1 implies that more productive ﬁrms will serve more markets, and that an
exporting ﬁrm may not serve all markets, even if the destinations are very similar. These
predictions are well in line with recent empirical ﬁndings by Lawless (2009) and by Eaton,
Kortum, and Kramarz (2011) that ﬁrms do not enter export markets according to a common
14hierarchy that is determined by export destination characteristics. Our theory therefore nicely
complements the explanation given by Arkolakis (2010) and Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz
(2011), which is based on market as well as ﬁrm-speciﬁc heterogeneity in entry costs or market
size. In addition Proposition 1 is able to explain why the export strategy of one and the same
ﬁrm varies widely across countries with similar characteristics. This cannot be explained by
Eaton, Kortum, Kramarz (2011), who state: “In particular, it leaves the vastly diﬀerent
performance of the same ﬁrm in diﬀerent markets as a residual. Our analysis points to the
need for further research into accounting for this variation.”
Our explanation of these trade patterns is based on capacity-constraining labor market
frictions, which implies that – all else equal – ﬁrms that recruit their workers in more ﬂexible
labor markets will serve more export markets. In order to identify the link between the
capacity constraining eﬀect of labor market frictions and exports, we would need variation
in labor market frictions over time and across countries that does not coincide with other
trade liberalization policies. Testing the predictions of our model would require a very rich
data-set with export destinations given on the ﬁrm-level for a large set of countries. This
country-panel would then have to be linked to labor market indicies that characterize labor
market frictions.11
4.2 Firm structure and prices
Given the export decisions of ﬁrms with diﬀerent productivities, we are able to determine
the expected proﬁt of active ﬁrms in an economy [1 − Γ(ϕ∗)]Π. The free entry condition
























x = ϕ and ϕ0
x = ϕ∗. The derivation of equation (26) is given in Appendix D. Since
average proﬁts increase due to the additional foreign demand, the free entry curve in Figure
2 rotates outward if trade is liberalized. The zero cutoﬀ condition (20) remains unchanged
11The dataset that comes closest to fulﬁll these requirements is the “EFIGE - European Firms in a Global
Economy” data-set for European countries, which was compiled with an enormous amount of eﬀort by Halti-
wanger, Scarpetta and Schweiger (2010) for 16 developed and emerging economies (see for more details at
http://www.eﬁge.org/). However, even this data-set would have to be enriched by detailed ﬁrm information,
speciﬁcally, about whether a ﬁrm exports or not, and if, in which countries it exports.
15by opening up to trade since the lowest productivity ﬁrm will pay the reservation wage z and
only sells at the domestic market (compare Figure 2).
The higher expected proﬁt in an open economy compared to the closed economy, which
can be seen by comparing equations (26) and (19), triggers entry and increases the number
of active ﬁrms M for a given cutoﬀ productivity ϕ∗. Given the increased number of active
ﬁrms in the economy, potential entrants realize that their labor force will be lower than in
the closed economy and that they will not be able to produce enough to pay the per period
ﬁxed costs f. Thus, the zero-cutoﬀ productivity increases and low productivity ﬁrms do not
enter the market.
Figure 2: Number of ﬁrms and zero-cutoﬀ productivity in an open economy
Proposition 2 Given Assumption 1, the zero-cutoﬀ productivity ϕ∗ and the number of ac-
tive ﬁrms M in an open economy is higher than in autarky. The size of all ﬁrms l(w(ϕ))
decreases.
Proof. See Appendix D.
The monopsonistic labor market changes ﬁrms reactions to trade liberalization compared
to the reaction of ﬁrms in a frictionless labor market like in Melitz (2003). In a perfect labor
market exporting ﬁrms increase labor input until their marginal product is reduced to equal
the market wage. The higher demand for labor by exporting ﬁrms is meet at the cost of
16a lower labor input at non-exporting ﬁrms. In a frictional labor market without vacancy
creation the size of a ﬁrm’s labor force is determined by the position of a ﬁrm in the wage
oﬀer distribution. Thus, exporting ﬁrms are not able to increase their output since their
labor input is given by their position in the wage distribution. Their position in the wage
distribution decreases because the cutoﬀ-productivity increases. Hence, opening up to trade
will decrease a ﬁrm’s labor force. In addition it triggers entry of new ﬁrms that compete
for the same number of workers reducing the number of workers per ﬁrm even further. In
contrast to Melitz (2003), the increased foreign demand therefore leads to entry of additional
ﬁrms and not to growth of existing exporting ﬁrms. Figure 3 shows the ﬁrm size reactions in
a frictional labor market and compares it to the perfect labor market environment of Melitz
(2003). This result is speciﬁc to the simple case of no vacancy creation. In section 5, where we
allow for vacancy creation, highly productive exporting ﬁrms will grow while less productive
ﬁrms will shrink.
Figure 3: Firm size in autarky and in an open economy
Since exporting ﬁrms ﬁnd it very costly to increase their output in response to the increase
in foreign demand, they respond to the increased demand by increasing their prices. The
prices charged by exporting ﬁrms in the domestic market are no longer lower for exporting
ﬁrms compared to domestic ﬁrms like in Melitz (2003). As Figure 4 suggests, they are in the
same range as the prices of domestic ﬁrms. The exact relation depends on the quantities of
output sold as stated in the following Proposition.
17Proposition 3 Given Assumption 1, the highest domestic price of ﬁrms that export to 0 ≤























1 + jτρ/(ρ−1) ,
where ϕ0






Proof. The ﬁrm that charges the highest price of all ﬁrms exporting to j countries is
the ﬁrm with export-cutoﬀ productivity ϕ
j
x. It produces and sells the smallest quantity of

































Figure 4: Prices in autarky and in an open economy
While in the perfect labor market environment prices decrease with productivity, in a
frictional environment exporting ﬁrms charge similar prices compared to domestic ﬁrms be-
cause capacity constraining labor market frictions induce exporting ﬁrms to maximize their
proﬁts by selling only a limited quantity per market. These price patterns are well supported
by the empirical ﬁndings of Bughin (1996) and De Loecker and Warzynski (2009). Bughin
(1996) ﬁnds that the markup charged by ﬁrms increases with capacity constraints and boosts
export prices and De Loecker and Warzynski (2009) ﬁnd that exporters charge on average
higher markups and that markups increase upon export entry.
18Another explanation for similar domestic prices of non-exporting and exporting ﬁrms
that the empirical literature has suggested is the higher quality of the goods produced by
exporting ﬁrms (compare Kugler and Verhoogen, 2011, Co¸ sar, Guner, and Tybout, 2011, and
Fajgelbaum, 2011).
4.3 Unemployment and wages dispersion
Opening up to trade increases expected proﬁts, triggers ﬁrm entry and reduces unemploy-
ment. Like in Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011), Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) and
Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2009, 2010) additional demand from abroad increases ﬁrms’
revenue and their demand for labor. While ﬁrms in Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011),
Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) and Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2009, 2010) create ad-
ditional vacancies in order to increase their employment, in our frictional environment ad-
ditional ﬁrms enter the market since the simple framework does not allow them to increase
their recruitment rate by opening new vacancies.
In the given context, opening up to trade still leads the lowest productivity ﬁrm to pay the
level of unemployment beneﬁts z like in autarky. Since the zero-cutoﬀ productivity increases
compared to autarky, i.e., ϕ∗
T > ϕ∗
A, some ﬁrms with a productivity ϕ ≥ ϕ∗
T > ϕ∗
A that paid a
wage above z will decrease their wages since they now occupy a lower position within the wage
oﬀer distribution. However, if we hold the position of a ﬁrm in the wage distribution constant,
trade liberalization increases wages because the marginal revenue of all ﬁrms increases due
to the lower number of employees that they are able to recruit. Exporting ﬁrms experience
even a higher increase in their marginal revenues since they can now charge higher prices
by serving not only the domestic but also foreign markets. Thus, two counteracting eﬀects
drive wage changes: (i) the positive eﬀect of an increase in the marginal revenue of a ﬁrm
and, (ii) the negative eﬀect of a lower position in the wage distribution. Of course, the
negative eﬀect is zero for the highest productivity ﬁrm ϕ, such that wages increase at the
upper end of the wage distribution. Since wages at the bottom of the wage distribution
are held constant by the level of unemployment beneﬁts z, it follows that the dispersion of
wages measured as diﬀerence between the highest and the lowest wage is higher in an open
economy than in autarky. The eﬀect on the average wage is ambiguous and depends on the
shape of the productivity distribution as well as the job ﬁnding and job destruction rate that
translate the wage oﬀer distribution into the wage earnings distribution as stated in equation
19(13). Proposition 4 summarizes the eﬀect of trade liberalization on unemployment and wage
dispersion.
Proposition 4 Given Assumption 1, opening up to trade reduces the unemployment rate u
and increases wage dispersion, i.e., increases w(ϕ) − z, compared to autarky.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Figure 5: Wages in autarky and in an open economy
The results concerning the eﬀects of trade liberalization on the wage distribution of ex-
ante identical workers are similar to the papers by Egger and Kreickemeier (2008), Amiti and
Davis (2011) and Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2009, 2010). However, in our context
wage inequality is not the result of exogenously given fair-wage preferences12 or the result of
monitoring or screening costs, but rather the result of continuous search for better jobs of
workers, as introduced in Burdett and Mortensen (1998).
12Whereas in Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) fair-wage preferences are linked to productivity diﬀerences
between ﬁrms, they are based on proﬁts of ﬁrms in Egger and Kreickemeier (2008) and Amiti and Davis
(2011).
205 Vacancy creation in an open economy
5.1 The matching technology
In previous sections the analysis was based on the assumption that all ﬁrms have a constant
recruitment rate ηv and cannot expand their production by opening new vacancies in response
to an increase in foreign demand. In this section we allow ﬁrms to inﬂuence their contact rate
by posting vacancies like in Mortensen (2003). The contact rate of a ﬁrm with productivity
ϕ depends on the number of vacancies v (ϕ) and is given by ηv (ϕ). The total number of
contacts in an economy (and the contact rate of workers) is therefore given by





dΓ(ϕ) = ηMe v. (27)
The per period cost of vacancy creation is an increasing function of the vacancies opened,
i.e., c(v) = c
αv (ϕ)
α. This cost function allows us to compare our results with the case of
constant vacancy creation cost, α = 1, like in Felbermayr, Prat and Schmerer (2011), who
link the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model (see Pissarides, 2000) model with the Melitz
(2003) model.
Convex vacancy costs are crucial for our results. The empirical evidence on the shape of
the vacancy cost function is small. Abowd and Kramarz (2003) and Kramarz and Michaud
(2010) use French ﬁrm level data and Blatter, M¨ uhlemann, and Schenker (2009) use Swiss
ﬁrm level data to look at the shape of the hiring cost function. However, hiring cost functions
do not necessarily have the same shape as vacancy cost functions because the hiring rate per
vacancy is generally not constant but increasing in the size of a ﬁrm and therefore increasing
in the number of workers hired. This property holds in the Burdett-Mortensen model like
in any monopsony wage model as shown by Manning (2006). Using ﬁrm level data from
the Labour Turnover Survey in the UK, Manning (2006) shows that there are increasing
marginal costs of recruitment. Similarly, using quarterly, corporate sector data for the US
economy Merz and Yashiv (2007) show that convex adjustment costs for labor and capital
is able to account for the data much better than formulations ignoring hiring costs. At the
end of section 5.5, where we simulate the general model with vacancy creation, we show that
a convex vacancy cost function is consistent with the mildly concave hiring cost function
found by Abowd and Kramarz (2003) and Kramarz and Michaud (2010) for France as well
as the convex hiring cost function found by Blatter, M¨ uhlemann, and Schenker (2009) for
21Switzerland.
5.2 Labor market and trade pattern
In an open economy a ﬁrm with productivity ϕ chooses its wage w(ϕ) and its number of
vacancies v (ϕ) such that per period proﬁts are maximized for a given number of export
markets j, i.e.,








ρ − w(ϕ)l(ϕ,v) −
c
α
vα − f − jfx
￿
s.t. l(ϕ,v) =
ηv [κ + δ]
[κ + δ + λ(Me v)[1 − F (w(ϕ))]]
2. (28)
The number of employees l(ϕ) working for a ﬁrm with productivity ϕ increases proportionally
with the number of vacancies like in Mortensen (2003) and with the wage like in Burdett and
Mortensen (1998). Thus, ﬁrms can increase their labor input by increasing their wage and
by opening more vacancies.
As long as the marginal revenue of a ﬁrm is higher than its wage, i.e., as long as As-
sumption 1 holds, more productive ﬁrms will pay higher wages. The reason is the same as
in the original Burdett-Mortensen model. If a measure of ﬁrms pays the same wage, paying
a slightly higher wage only marginally increases the cost per worker, while the additional
revenue generated by the signiﬁcantly higher labor force increases proﬁts signiﬁcantly. Thus,
more productive ﬁrms will pay higher wages.
Because the contact rate between a worker and a speciﬁc ﬁrm is proportional to the num-
ber of vacancies posted by the ﬁrm and because wage oﬀers are increasing in the productivity




ϕ∗ v (e ϕ)dΓ(e ϕ)
R ϕ
ϕ∗ v (e ϕ)dΓ(e ϕ)
. (29)
Firms choose wages such that the resulting increase in labor balances marginal revenue with
marginal labor cost. The number of vacancies are chosen such that the marginal net revenue
generated by the last opened vacancy equals the marginal cost of creating the vacancy. The






























22where the diﬀerential equation (31) follows from the fact that more productive ﬁrms pay
higher wages. Substituting F (w(ϕ)) according to equation (29) and (27) in equation (28)
yields
l(ϕ,v) =
ηv (κ + δ)
h


























with the terminal condition w(ϕ∗) = z.
The number of vacancies created by the ﬁrm is implicitly deﬁned by the vacancy creation
condition (30), where the wage w(ϕ) is given by the solution to the diﬀerential equation (33).
The average number of vacancies e v per active ﬁrm is obtained by integrating the vacancies







The number of export countries a ﬁrm is willing to enter depend – like in the simple model
– on the comparison of proﬁts from exporting to j or j − 1 countries, i.e.,
Πd+j (ϕ) ≷ Πd+j−1 (ϕ). (35)
5.3 Product market
The product market equilibrium is deﬁned by two conditions, the free entry condition that
determines the number of active ﬁrms in the economy M given the vacancy creation decision
in the labor market (that determines the average number of vacancies e v per active ﬁrm)
and the zero-cutoﬀ productivity condition that determines the productivity level ϕ∗ that
guarantees non-negative proﬁts.
Firms only enter the market if the proﬁts they are able to generate are positive. Using
the vacancy creation condition (30) one can write total proﬁts of a ﬁrm serving the home
market and j export markets as














α − f − jfx. (36)
Since the ﬁrm with the lowest productivity pays a wage equal to unemployment beneﬁts, the
zero-cutoﬀ productivity ϕ∗, deﬁned as δΠd (ϕ∗) = 0, is given by the solution to the system
23of two equations determining the zero-cutoﬀ productivity ϕ∗ and the number of vacancies









α = f, (37)
ρ[ϕ∗l(ϕ∗)]
ρ − zl(ϕ∗) = cv (ϕ∗)
α . (38)
The labor force size of the zero-cutoﬀ productivity ﬁrm is according to equation (28) given
by
l(ϕ∗) =
ηv (ϕ∗)(κ + δ)
[κ + δ + ηMe v]
2.
The free entry condition ensures that the proﬁts generated by all ﬁrms are used to pay the
investment cost fe of potential market entrants. The expected discounted proﬁt of exporting




Πmax (ϕ)γ (ϕ)dϕ, (39)
where Πmax (ϕ) = maxi Πd+i (ϕ) denotes the maximum proﬁts attainable by a ﬁrm with
productivity ϕ.
5.4 The case of linear vacancy creation costs (α = 1)
If vacancy creation costs are linear, i.e., α = 1, the vacancy creation condition reveals that
ﬁrms increase their number of vacancies such that the marginal revenues are equalized across












Firms choose the number of export markets j such that proﬁts are maximized, i.e., maxj Πd+j (ϕ).
Since marginal revenues are equalized across ﬁrms, all exporting ﬁrms increase their produc-
tion in order to serve all export markets.
Proposition 5 If vacancy creation costs are linear, then all exporting ﬁrms serve all n for-















24Proof. Comparing the proﬁts of exporting to j or j − k countries, i.e., δΠd+j (ϕ) =
δΠd+j−k (ϕ), gives
















Using equation (40) to substitute the labor input l(ϕ,j) into the proﬁt comparison condition
(42) gives the desired result.
Thus, with linear vacancy creation costs exporting ﬁrms create so many vacancies that
their output is large enough to meet the additional demand of all n export countries like in
Felbermayr, Prat, Schmerer (2011), Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) and Helpman, Itskhoki,
and Redding (2009, 2010).
Wages are still dispersed although marginal revenues are constant across productivities










The reason is the same as in the simple Burdett-Mortensen model. If ﬁrms paid the same
wage, each ﬁrm would have an incentive to deviate and oﬀer a slightly higher wage since
it will then be able to recruit also workers employed at other ﬁrms and would therefore be
able to recruit additional workers at no extra cost (i.e., could save on vacancy creation cost).
Thus, in equilibrium high productivity ﬁrms pay high wages and have low turnover, while
low productivity ﬁrms pay low wages and have high turnover.
5.5 The case of convex vacancy creation costs (α > 1)
As shown by the following simulation, in the case of convex vacancy creation costs and on-
the-job search labor market frictions all our propositions hold with one exception: Suﬃciently
productive exporting ﬁrms will be larger in a global economy compared to autarky.
5.5.1 Simulation method
As the model with endogenous vacancy creation can no longer be solved analytically, we rely
on numerical solutions. We assume productivity to be Pareto distributed
Γ(ϕ) =
[ϕ]−γ − ϕ−γ
[ϕ]−γ − [ϕ]−γ and γ (ϕ) =
γϕ−γ−1
[ϕ]−γ − [ϕ]−γ.
25In order to simulate the model, we proceed as follows.13 First we construct a grid of ϕ,
running from ϕ to ϕ in equal steps. Afterwards we specify a starting value for ϕ∗ somewhere
above ϕ and below ϕ. For each element of the vector ϕ we check whether the value of ϕ is
greater than ϕ∗. If not, we assign the value zero to the vector of ϕ.
Next, we multiply the values of this vector with the step size of ϕ and initialize the vector
for the vacancies v(ϕ). Later in subsequent loops the vacancies v(ϕ) are determined according





1−Γ(ϕ∗)dΓ(e ϕ) = e v for each value of ϕ.
To obtain the wages for each value of ϕ, we start with the value z at ϕ∗. Then, we add
∂w(ϕ)/∂ϕ × step size of ϕ to the previous wage, where ∂w(ϕ)/∂ϕ is given by (33). Labor
input per ﬁrm is calculated using equation (32).
Given wages w(ϕ) and labor inputs l(ϕ) the next steps within the same loop are to
recalculate vacancies v(ϕ) according to (30) and labor inputs l(ϕ) according to (32). We
then calculate the sum over the changes in v(ϕ) from the previous and current calculation in
the loop. If this change is positive, we increase every element in v(ϕ) by multiplying the old
values by 0.9999, and otherwise by 1.0001. We repeat this inner loop until the sum of the





each value of ϕ.
Given the values of e v, v(ϕ), w(ϕ), and l(ϕ), we construct a matrix of size grid size×(number
of countries), where we calculate for each value of ϕ the (potential) total proﬁt if the ﬁrm
would export to zero, one, two countries, and so on, up to the maximum number of trading
partners. Proﬁts are given by equation (36). Given this matrix we next construct a vector
that contains the number of countries that a ﬁrm with productivity ϕ should export to in
order to maximum proﬁts. The zero-cutoﬀ productivity ϕ∗ is given by the value of ϕ where
total proﬁts are equal to zero and where it is proﬁt maximizing for a ﬁrm to serve only the
home market.
After a ﬁrst initialization of a chosen value of M, we calculate the free entry condition as
given in equation (39). If this value is negative, we reduce the number of ﬁrms M by 0.1%;
otherwise we increase it by 0.1%. We then repeat the whole process with the new value of
13We solve our model using Matlab Release R2009b. The m-ﬁle is available upon request from the authors.
26M until M converges.14
For the simulations we have chosen the following parameter values, χ = 0.05, η = 0.01,
δ = 0.02, ρ = 0.75, τ = 1.8, c = 1000000, α = 5, f = 0.0002, fx = 35f, fe = 10, γ = 3.4,
ϕ = 10, ϕ = 100 and z = 1. For the case with trade we assume 99 trading partners, i.e., 100
countries.15
5.5.2 Results
Throughout this section we focus on two scenarios: A world where the country is in autarky
and a world where there are 99 symmetric trading partners.16
In Figure 6 we plot the number of vacancies created (left panel) and the number of export
markets served by a ﬁrm with productivity ϕ (right panel). In line with Proposition 1 the
number of export markets served is an increasing function of productivity. We calibrated the
model such that no ﬁrm is willing to export to all foreign markets. Firms with the highest
productivities enter 42 out of the 50 markets. Like in the model with ﬁxed vacancies the level
of productivity where ﬁrms can successfully survive ϕ∗ is higher in the open economy than
in autarky.


































Figure 6: Vacancies and number of countries served in autarky and in an open economy with
endogenous vacancies
















15The grid size is chosen to be 1000. However, results do not depend on the chosen grid size.
16The number of (potential) trading partners is not crucial for the basic qualitative results.
27With trade the number of vacancies per ﬁrm is lower than in autarky for low-productivity
ﬁrms, but higher for high productivity ﬁrms. Additionally, the number of vacancies are in-
creasing with productivity in both scenarios. More importantly, the number of vacancies
jumps up at each export-cutoﬀ because ﬁrms increase their labor input in response to addi-
tional demand from abroad. Convex vacancy creation costs, however, restrict ﬁrms in their
ability to grow.
Figure 7 plots labor inputs (left panel) and outputs (right panel) per ﬁrm. The pattern
of vacancies translates into labor input and output pattern. Labor input and output per
ﬁrm is lower in the open economy as in autarky for low-productivity ﬁrms and higher for
high-productivity ﬁrms. High productivity ﬁrms grow at the expense of low productivity
ﬁrms because the additional revenues from exports allow them to create more vacancies.
Unlike in Melitz (2003) not all exporting ﬁrms grow because the increased competition in the
labor market due to the increased number of vacancies has a negative eﬀect on employment
per ﬁrm, similar to the negative impact that the increased number of active ﬁrms M has
on labor input in the basic framework without vacancy creation. Hence, the basic results
of Proposition 2 for the case of ﬁxed vacancies survive with the qualiﬁcation that only less
productive ﬁrms shrink when opening up to trade.













































Figure 7: Firm size (labor input and output) in autarky and in an open economy with
endogenous vacancies
Let us now investigate domestic prices and quantities under autarky and in an open
economy. Like in Melitz (2003) domestic variety prices are a monotonically falling function
28of ϕ under autarky (Figure 8). However, with trade the domestic price proﬁle of ﬁrms looks
very diﬀerent. First, ﬁrms that only sell domestically charge a slightly higher price as ﬁrms
under autarky because the increased competition in the labor market reduces their output
(see Figure 7). The ﬁrm that exports to one trading partner charges a higher price in the
domestic market than the ﬁrm selling only locally. The domestic price of the least productive
ﬁrm in the group of ﬁrms that export to more than one country is slightly lower than the
price charged by the least productive ﬁrm that exports to only one country. However, the
price is still higher than the domestic price of the ﬁrm that only serves the local market.17
These results are similar to our results shown in Figure 4b.












































Figure 8: Domestic quantities and prices in autarky and in an open economy with endogenous
vacancies
Quantities are just the reverse image of prices charged in the domestic market. The right
panel shows that the domestically sold quantities are much higher under autarky than in an
open economy, speciﬁcally for very productive ﬁrms. The quantity of the least productive
ﬁrm, i.e., the ﬁrm with productivity ϕ∗, is higher than the quantity of the least productive
ﬁrm serving in addition to the domestic market one foreign market. Hence, the results that
we derived in Proposition 3 survive under endogenous vacancy creation.
Figure 9 shows total proﬁts of ﬁrms as a function of productivity. In both scenarios,
17We set the number of (potential) trading partners large enough so that even the most productive ﬁrm
does not serve all foreign markets. If we would allow a ﬁrm to hit the boundary for expanding the number of
markets to be served, this ﬁrm can only expand by lowering the prices. This would be reﬂected by a fall of
the price line at the right.
29autarky and trade, proﬁts are increasing in productivity. Even though there are jumps
in prices and quantities there are no jumps in the proﬁt function. The extra revenues from
exporting are used to pay for the foreign market entry costs. This is equivalent to the export-
cutoﬀ condition, where the least productive ﬁrm entering j markets has to be indiﬀerent
between entering j markets or only serving j − 1 markets.






















Figure 9: Proﬁts as a function of productivity in autarky and in an open economy with
endogenous vacancy creation.
If we compare the proﬁts of ﬁrms in autarky and in an open economy, we see that the proﬁt
function under trade is much steeper than under autarky. The reason is that by serving more
than one market, a ﬁrm can demand higher prices in every market and therefore generate
higher proﬁts with the same output. Furthermore, like in Melitz (2003) there are some low
productivity ﬁrms that make lower proﬁts in an open economy than under autarky because
the increased competition on the labor market reduces low productivity ﬁrms’ labor input
and thus the output necessary to generate higher proﬁts.
In Figure 10 we plot wages as a function of productivity (left panel) and the wage distri-
bution (right panel). Wages are an increasing function of productivity under both, autarky
and trade. Interesting are the following three observations: (i) The wage distribution starts
at lower productivity values in autarky than in an open economy. This reﬂects the fact that
only more productive ﬁrms can survive in an open economy, i.e., the zero-cut-oﬀ productivity
ϕ∗ increases when opening up to trade.18 (ii) Wages are at least as high as unemployment
18The eﬀect is very small, though. Hence, it can not be seen in the ﬁgure.
30beneﬁts z. (iii) The wage function is much steeper in an open economy because exporting
generates higher proﬁts and opens up the opportunity for ﬁrms to pay higher wages.


















































Figure 10: Wages and wage distributions in autarky and in an open economy with endogenous
vacancy creation.
We can also compare the wage distribution in autarky and in an open economy. The right
panel of Figure 10 shows that in both situations the lowest wage is given by z. Since wages
increase at exporting ﬁrms, opening up to trade leads to a much larger wage dispersion as
predicted in Proposition 4. Hence, allowing for vacancy creation does not lead to diﬀerent
conclusions regarding the eﬀects of trade on the wage distribution. Note, that with endoge-
nous vacancy creation it still holds that in an open economy the number of ﬁrms is higher
and the unemployment rate lower compared to autarky.
5.5.3 Convex vacancy costs and concave hiring costs
Abowd and Kramarz (2003) and Kramarz and Michaud (2010) have shown that the shape
of the hiring cost function for French ﬁrms is mildly concave, while Blatter, M¨ uhlemann
and Schenker (2009) have shown that the shape of the hiring cost function for Swiss ﬁrms
is convex. In this section we show that a convex vacancy cost function is consistent with a
concave and a convex hiring cost function. Hiring cost functions have the same shape as the
vacancy cost functions if the hiring rate h(v) per vacancy is the same for all ﬁrms. However,
the hiring rate per vacancy is increasing in the wage because job oﬀers made by high wage
ﬁrms are accepted by more employed workers. This property holds in the Burdett-Mortensen
31model like in any monopsony wage model as shown by Manning (2006).19 It can also be seen
by looking at the equation for the hiring rate per vacancy given by
h(v) = η [u + (1 − u)G(w)].




Thus, the total number of workers hired H = h(v)v increase with the wage for two reasons:
(i) the number of vacancies created increase with the wage and (ii) the hiring rate per vacancy
increases with the wage.
Now consider the shape of the hiring cost function K (H) given any convex vacancy cost
function c(v) with c′
v (v) > 0 and c′′
vv (v) > 0. Using the inverse function of H = h(v)v and
















where the inequality follows from
∂h(v)
∂w











































∂w2 = (1 − u)g′
w (w) ≷ 0 and
∂2w(v)
∂v2 ≷ 0.
Thus, a convex vacancy cost function implies a concave hiring cost function, if and only if
c′′
























19Using ﬁrm level data from the Labour Turnover Survey in the UK, Manning (2006) shows that there are
increasing marginal costs of recruitment, i.e., that the vacancy cost function is convex.








































Figure 11: Hiring cost function for the convex vacancy cost function
which is feasible since ∂h(v)/∂w > 0 and ∂w(v)/∂v > 0. Thus, a convex vacancy cost
function is consistent with a concave hiring cost function as found by Abowd and Kramarz
(2003) and Kramarz and Michaud (2010) for French ﬁrms as well as a convex hiring cost
function as found by Blatter, M¨ uhlemann and Schenker (2009) for Swiss ﬁrms.
Our simulations also provide an example that a convex vacancy cost function leads to a
concave hiring cost function as shown in the following Figure.20
6 Conclusions
The implications of trade liberalization on wages and unemployment is one of the most heavily
discussed consequences of increasing globalization. Recent evidence suggests that overall
trade reduces unemployment, but has heavily asymmetric distributional consequences. Most
recent models of trade and unemployment emphases the role of trade on unemployment, while
little is known about the consequences of labor market frictions on the structure of trade. We
use the on-the-job search model from Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and combine it with the
Melitz (2003) trade model in order to investigate the eﬀects of capacity constraining labor
market frictions in a global economy.
We show that capacity constraints heavily alter the results compared to models with
perfect labor markets or imperfect labor markets without capacity constraining eﬀects, such
20The parametrization is as follows: χ = 0.02, η = 0.9, δ = 0.02, ρ = 0.75, c = 500, α = 1.01, f = 0.0001,
fe = 5, γ = 3.2, ϕ = 30, ϕ = 100 and z = 1. We only focus on the case of autarky here.
33as the recent works by Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011), Helpman and Itskhoki (2010)
and Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2009, 2010). With capacity constraining labor market
frictions not all ﬁrms will serve all export markets, even when export markets are similar.
Rather the number of export markets served by a ﬁrm is increasing in its productivity. Even
though exporting ﬁrms are more productive, they do not necessarily charge lower prices
as in the Melitz (2003) model. Rather, they maximize proﬁts by serving only part of the
export markets and by charging the monopolistic price in each market. Given the capacity
constraints that ﬁrms face if they want to recruit more workers in their domestic country, an
obvious extension of our model is to allow for foreign direct investment since it would allow
ﬁrms to relax their capacity constraints by recruiting and producing in a foreign country.
Concerning trade liberalization we ﬁnd that unemployment falls and wage dispersion
increases with trade liberalization. Note that in our context wage inequality is the result of
continuous search for better jobs and not of fair-wage preferences or the result of monitoring
or screening.
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Appendix A: Wages oﬀers
Wages increase with productivity
To show that wages increase with productivity we follow Mortensen (1990). On the support
of the wage oﬀer distribution it must be that
π (ϕ) = ϕρl(w(ϕ))
ρ − w(ϕ)l(w(ϕ)) − f for all w(ϕ) ∈ supp(F),
















These equilibrium conditions imply for ϕ > ϕ′
ϕρl(w(ϕ))






























The diﬀerence of the ﬁrst and the last term of this inequality is greater than or equal the
















Since l(w(ϕ)) is an increasing function of the wage, it implies that wages are weakly increasing
in productivity. Since ﬁrms always have an incentive to deviate if other ﬁrms oﬀer the same
wage, it follows that wages strictly increase with productivity.
38Wage oﬀers, if Assumption 1 does not hold








This equation can only hold for ϕρρl(w(ϕ))
(ρ−1) − w(ϕ) > 0 since ∂l(w(ϕ))/∂w(ϕ) > 0.
If this condition, i.e., Assumption 1 is not satisﬁed, ﬁrms with productivity ϕ ∈ [ϕ∗, b ϕ] pay
w(ϕ) = z, where the productivity b ϕ is deﬁned such that ρ[b ϕl(b ϕ)]
ρ = zl(b ϕ). The size of the
ﬁrm’s labor force l(b ϕ) is given by
l(b ϕ) = ηv
u + (1 − u)G(w− (ϕ))
κ + δ + λ(M)[1 − F (w(ϕ))]
,
where G(w(ϕ)) = G(w− (ϕ))+µ(w(ϕ)) and µ(w(ϕ)) denotes the mass of workers employed
at ﬁrms oﬀering the wage w(ϕ), and G(w− (ϕ)) are all the workers getting a wage lower than
w(ϕ). G(w(ϕ)) = G(w− (ϕ))+µ(w(ϕ)) states that the whole wage distribution is given by
all the workers earning wages lower than w(ϕ) plus the once earning exactly wages w(ϕ).
Since ﬁrms with a marginal revenue below z will not ﬁnd it optimal to increase their labor
input by increasing wage, the mass point is at the lower bound of the wage distribution. Thus,
G(w− (ϕ)) = 0. Using equations (11) and (17) we get
l(b ϕ) =
ηv [1 − Γ(ϕ∗)]
(κ + δ)[1 − Γ(ϕ∗)] + ηMv [1 − Γ(b ϕ)]
κ + δ
κ + δ + ηMv
.
We proceed by assuming that the marginal revenue of a ﬁrm exceeds the level of unemploy-
ment beneﬁts, i.e., assume that Assumption 1 holds. If Assumption 1 holds, more productive
ﬁrms oﬀer higher wages and the ﬁrst order condition (15) holds for all ϕ ∈ [ϕ∗,ϕ]. Hence,
the labor force of all ﬁrms operating is given by equation (14).
Appendix B: Derivation of the wage function w(ϕ)





























Substitution simpliﬁes the above diﬀerential equation to
∂w(ϕ)
∂ϕ













T′ (e ϕ)de ϕ + A, (43)






















































































w(ϕ∗)eT(ϕ∗) = zeT(ϕ∗) = A.
Substituting eT(ϕ) = l(w(ϕ)) and z by using the zero-cutoﬀ condition (20) gives the wage
equation (18).
Appendix C: Equilibrium in autarky







ϕ∗ ρ2 [e ϕl(w(e ϕ))]
(ρ−1) ∂l(w(e ϕ))















40where the inequality follows because ∂l(w(e ϕ))/∂ϕ∗ < 0 and ∂l(w(e ϕ))/∂M < 0. Thus, the
free entry condition deﬁnes a decreasing relation between the zero-cutoﬀ productivity ϕ∗ and
the number of active ﬁrms M in the market.
















where Assumption 1 ensures an increasing relation between the zero-cutoﬀ productivity ϕ∗
and the number of active ﬁrms M in the market.
An equilibrium only exists if unemployment beneﬁts z and the ﬁxed costs f are low
enough.
Appendix D: The open economy
Quantities sold in the domestic and each export market
An exporting ﬁrm that decided to serve j foreign countries maximizes its proﬁts by equalizing
marginal revenues across markets. Revenues of an exporting ﬁrm are given by



































Rearranging and using the fact that qd (ϕ) = q (ϕ)−jqx (ϕ) implies equations (21) and (22).
41The revenue of an exporting ﬁrm is, therefore, given by
R(ϕ) =
"
























Proof of Proposition 1: Export-cutoﬀs
The export-cutoﬀ productivity ϕn




















ρ − w(ϕ)l(w(ϕ)) − f − jfx.
Since proﬁt maximization implies that the wage is continuous at ϕ
j
x, i.e., that both wages
are the same, and since the same wage implies that the number of workers employed by both


































− f − jfx
=
h
























− f − (j − 1)fx.












































































































































42Wages in an open economy
The wage equation for exporting ﬁrms follows from the ﬁrst order condition and the equilib-
rium condition (17), leading to the following diﬀerential equation
∂w(ϕ)
∂ϕ











where T (ϕ) and T′ (ϕ) are deﬁned in Appendix A. The solution to this diﬀerential equation









































































































de ϕ + zeT(ϕ∗).
Since A depends on the wage payments of those ﬁrms with export-cutoﬀ productivities ϕ
j
x < ϕ























































































































































































































ρ de ϕ − f.
The wage equation (24) follows immediately by deﬁning ϕ = ϕ
j+1
x and ϕ∗ = ϕ0
x.
Average proﬁts in an open economy


























x = ϕ and ϕ0
x = ϕ∗. Since free entry implies fe = Πe (ϕ∗) =
R ϕ
ϕ∗ Π(ϕ)γ (ϕ)dϕ,
integrating over all ﬁrms with productivity ϕ ∈ [ϕ∗,ϕ] implies the free entry condition for an
open economy as stated in equation (26).
Proof of Proposition 2: Upward rotation of the free entry condition
We need to show that for each ϕ∗ ∈ [0,ϕ) the number of active ﬁrms increases, i.e., MT > MA.
Suppose the opposite, i.e., MT ≤ MA. Thus, labor input for a ﬁrm with productivity ϕ is
44given by lT (w(ϕ)) ≥ lA (w(ϕ)) according to equation (14). Since
h





it follows that Πe (ϕ∗)|Trade > Πe (ϕ∗)|Autarky = fe. This contradicts, however, the free entry
condition in an open economy. Thus, MT > MA. The increase in the number of active ﬁrms
M increases the zero-cutoﬀ productivity ϕ∗. It is easy to verify from equation (14) that the
size of all ﬁrms l(w(ϕ)) decreases.
Appendix E, Proof of Proposition 4: Unemployment and wage
dispersion in an open economy
It follows from equation (11) that the unemployment rate decreases as the number of active
ﬁrms M increases in response to opening the economy for trade.
The increase in the number of active ﬁrms M and the increase in the zero-cutoﬀ produc-
tivity ϕ∗ in response to opening up to trade implies that wages increase if the position of a

























x = ϕ and ϕ0
x = ϕ∗. First, keep l(w(ϕ)) constant and notice that for a given






for all i < j. Second, an increase in M leads to a lower labor size l(w(ϕ)).



















Thus, the wage must increase since a decrease in labor input l(w(ϕ)) decreases the lhs more
then the rhs. Third, an increase in ϕ∗ while keeping F (w) constant reduces the integral in
the second line of the above equation and thereby increases the wage. Since the position
of the wage distribution of the highest productivity ﬁrm, i.e., F (w(ϕ)) = 1, remains un-
changed, it follows that the highest wage increases. Since the lowest wage equals the level
45of unemployment beneﬁt z in the closed and open economy, it follows that wage dispersion
w(ϕ) − z is higher in an open economy than in a closed economy.
Appendix F: Vacancy creation condition for linear vacancy
costs












where we used ∂l(ϕ,v)/∂v = l(ϕ,v)/v. Similar to Appendix A we deﬁne,
l(ϕ) = ηv (ϕ)(κ + δ)eT(ϕ),
where
T (ϕ) = −log
"￿
















































where A = z follows from w(ϕ∗) = z. Substituting the wage w(ϕ) into the optimality
condition for vacancies (30) for α = 1 gives the stated result.
46